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Multiparty controlled quantum secure direct communication using
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National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
Base on the idea of dense coding of three-photon entangled state and qubit transmission in blocks,
we present a multiparty controlled quantum secret direct communication scheme using Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger state. In the present scheme, the sender transmits her three bits of secret message
to the receiver directly and the secret message can only be recovered by the receiver under the
permission of all the controllers. All three-photon entangled states are used to transmit the secret
messages except those chosen for eavesdropping check and the present scheme has a high source
capacity because Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state forms a large Hilbert space.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum communication has been one of the most
promising applications of quantum information science.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) which provides uncon-
ditionally secure key exchange has progressed quickly
since the first QKD protocol was proposed by Ben-
neett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. A good many of other
quantum communication schemes have also been pro-
posed and pursued, such as Quantum secret sharing
(QSS)[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], quantum secure direct commu-
nication (QSDC) [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
QSS is the generalization of classical secret sharing to
quantum scenario and can share both classical and quan-
tum messages among sharers. Many researches have been
carried out in both theoretical and experimental aspects
after the pioneering QSS scheme proposed by Hillery,
Buzeˇk and Berthiaume in 1999 [2]. Different from QKD,
QSDC’s object is to transmit the secret messages di-
rectly without first establishing a key to encrypt them.
QSDC can be used in some special environments which
has been shown by Bostro¨em and Deng et al.[9, 10].
The works on QSDC attracted a great deal of atten-
tions and can be divided into two kinds, one utilizes
single photon [11, 12], the other utilizes entangled state
[9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Deng et al. proposed
a QSDC scheme using batches of single photons which
serves as one-time pad [11]. Cai et al. presented a deter-
ministic secure direct communication scheme using single
qubit in a mixed state [12]. The QSDC scheme using en-
tanglement state is certainly the mainstream. Bostro¨m
and Felbinger proposed a ”Ping-Pong” QSDC protocol
which is quasi-secure for secure direct communication if
perfect quantum channel is used [9]. Cai et al. pointed
out that the ”Ping-Pong” Protocol is vulnerable to denial
of service attack or joint horse attack with invisible pho-
ton [19, 20]. They also presented an improved protocol
which doubled the capacity of the ”Ping-Pong” protocol
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[13]. Deng et al. put forward a two-step QSDC proto-
col using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs [10]. We
presented a QSDC scheme using EPR pairs and telepor-
tation [14]. Chuan Wang et al. proposed a QSDC scheme
with quantum superdense coding [15] and a multi-step
QSDC scheme using GHZ state [16]. Ting Gao et al. and
Zhan-jun Zhang et al. each presented a QSDC scheme
using entanglement swapping [17, 18].
In this paper, we present a multiparty controlled
QSDC (MCQSDC) scheme using GHZ state and its
transformation. In the present scheme, the sender’s se-
cret message is transmitted directly to the receiver and
can only be reconstructed by the receiver with the help
of all the controllers. Different to QSS, the sender trans-
mits his or her secret message to the receiver directly and
the information of the receiver is asymmetric to those
of the controllers. Our scheme employs dense coding of
three-photon entangled state proposed by H. J. Lee et
al.[21] and qubit transmission in blocks[22]. Eight possi-
ble states of GHZ state which form a complete orthonor-
mal basis, carry three bits of information and all GHZ
states are used to transmit the secret messages except
those chosen for eavesdropping check. We also discuss
the security of the scheme, which is unconditionally se-
cure.
We first present a single party controlled QSDC scheme
(CQSDC) and then generalize it to a MCQSDC scheme.
In the scheme, we utilize dense coding of three-photon
GHZ state. There are eight independent three-photon
GHZ states which form a complete orthonormal basis,
namely
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) = 1√
2
(|φ+〉|+〉+ |φ−〉|−〉),
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉) = 1√
2
(|φ−〉|+〉+ |φ+〉|−〉),
|Ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉+ |011〉) = 1√
2
(|ψ+〉|+〉 − |ψ−〉|−〉),
|Ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉 − |011〉) = 1√
2
(|ψ+〉|−〉 − |ψ−〉|+〉),
2|Ψ5〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉+ |101〉) = 1√
2
(|ψ+〉|+〉+ |ψ−〉|−〉),
|Ψ6〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉) = 1√
2
(|ψ+〉|−〉+ |ψ−〉|+〉),
|Ψ7〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉+ |001〉) = 1√
2
(|φ+〉|+〉 − |φ−〉|−〉),
|Ψ8〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉 − |001〉) = 1√
2
(|φ+〉|−〉 − |φ−〉|+〉),
(1)
where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), |φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). (2)
|Ψk〉, k = 1, 2, · · · , 8 can be transformed into each other
by performing one of four unitary operations,
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|,
σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|,
iσy = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, (3)
on any two of the three photons. Suppose the initial state
is |Ψ1〉, we illustrate the transformation of GHZ states in
Table 1.
TABLE I: The transformation of GHZ states by performing
operations on two photons
unitary operations on the first and the second photon
|Ψ1〉 σz ⊗ σz or I ⊗ I
|Ψ2〉 I ⊗ σz or σz ⊗ I
|Ψ3〉 iσy ⊗ σz or σx ⊗ I
|Ψ4〉 σx ⊗ σz or iσy ⊗ I
|Ψ5〉 I ⊗ σx or σz ⊗ iσy
|Ψ6〉 σz ⊗ σx or I ⊗ iσy
|Ψ7〉 σx ⊗ σx or iσy ⊗ iσy
|Ψ8〉 iσy ⊗ σx or σx ⊗ iσy
In order to distinguish the sender’s operations correctly
in our scheme, we select eight two-photon operations,
U1, U2, · · · , U8 from sixteen operations, where
U1 = σz ⊗ σz, U2 = I ⊗ σz ,
U3 = iσy ⊗ σz, U4 = σx ⊗ σz,
U5 = I ⊗ σx, U6 = σz ⊗ σx,
U7 = σx ⊗ σx, U8 = iσy ⊗ σx. (4)
Thus we obtain |Ψk〉 (k = 1, · · · , 8) if Uk is performed
on the |Ψ1〉. We now describe the CQSDC scheme in
detail. Suppose the sender Alice want to transmit her
secret message directly to the receiver Charlie under the
control of the controller Bob.
(S1) Bob prepares an ordered N three-photon states.
Each of the three-photon states is in the state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC . (5)
We denotes the ordered N three-photon qubits
with {[P1(A),P1(B),P1(C)], [P2(A),P2(B),P2(C)], · · · ,
[PN(A),PN (B),PN (C)]}, where the subscript indicates
the order of each three-photon in the sequence, and A,
B, C represents the three photons of each state, respec-
tively. Bob takes one particle from each state to form
an ordered partner photon sequence [P1(A), P2(A),· · · ,
PN(A)], called A sequence. The remaining partner pho-
tons compose B sequence, [P1(B), P2(B),· · · , PN(B)]
and C sequence, [P1(C), P2(C),· · · , PN (C)]. Bob selects
randomly one of four unitary operations, I, σz, σx, iσy
and performs it on each of the photons in the B sequence.
He then sends the A sequence and the B sequence to Al-
ice and keeps the C sequence.
(S2) After receiving the A, B sequence, Alice selects
randomly a sufficiently large subset from A, B sequence
for eavesdropping check.
The procedure of the eavesdropping check is as fol-
lows: (a) Alice announces publicly the positions of the
selected photons. (b) Bob publishes his operations which
performed on the sampling photons in the B sequence.
(c) Alice then chooses randomly a measuring basis Z-
basis(|0〉,|1〉) or Bell-basis (|φ±〉, |ψ±〉) to measure the
selected photons in the A, B sequence and announces
publicly the measuring basis for each of the sampling
photons. (d) If Alice performs a Z-basis measurement,
Bob also performs Z-basis measurement on the corre-
sponding photons in the C sequence; If Alice performs
a Bell-basis measurement, Bob performs a X-basis (|+〉,
|−〉) measurement. After measurements, Bob publishes
his measurement results. Because of Bob’s unitary op-
erations, |Ψ〉 is changed to one of four GHZ states |Ψ1〉,
|Ψ2〉, |Ψ5〉, |Ψ6〉. According to Eq.1, Alice and Bob can
check the existence of eavesdropper by comparing their
measurement results. If the error rate exceeds the thresh-
old, they have to abort the communication. Otherwise
they continue to execute the next step.
(S3) Bob chooses randomly one of four unitary opera-
tions, I, σz, σx, iσy and performs it on each of the photons
in the C sequence. He then sends the C sequence photons
to Charlie.
(S4) Alice and Charlie analyze the error rate of the
transmission of C sequence. The method of eavesdrop-
ping check is similar to that of the step 2, but Bob should
announce his operations on the selected photons in the C
sequence after Charlie publish his measurement results.
If the error rate is below the threshold, they proceed to
execute the next step. Otherwise they abort the commu-
nication.
(S5) Alice first selects randomly two sufficiently large
subsets from A, B sequence for eavesdropping checks.
3She then performs randomly one of eight operations,
U1, U2, · · · , U8 on the sample photons of A, B sequence.
The operation Uk (k = 1, · · · 8) executed on the A, B
sequence makes the state |Ψ〉 become one of the eight
independent GHZ states, |Ψ1〉, |Ψ2〉, · · · , |Ψ8〉. Alice,
Bob and Charlie agree that the eight GHZ states |Ψ1〉,
|Ψ2〉, · · · , |Ψ8〉, represent a 3-bit of secret message, that is
|Ψ1〉→000, |Ψ2〉→001, |Ψ3〉→010, |Ψ4〉→011, |Ψ5〉→100,
|Ψ6〉→101, |Ψ7〉→110, |Ψ8〉→111. Alice encodes her se-
cret messages on the remaining photons of A, B sequence
by performing the unitary operations Uk(k = 1, · · · , 8).
She then sends the B sequence to Charlie. After hearing
from Charlie, Alice measures the sampling photons of one
subset ofA sequence in Z-basis orX-basis randomly. She
then publishes the positions of the sampling photons and
the measuring basis to each of the sampling photons. If
Alice performs a Z-basis (X-basis) measurement, Char-
lie performs a Z-basis (Bell-basis) measurement on the
corresponding sampling photon in the B, C sequence.
After measurements, he publishes his measurement re-
sults. Alice then lets Bob announce his operations on
the sampling photons of B, C sequence. Thus Alice and
Charlie can check eavesdropping by comparing their mea-
surement results. If they make certain that there is no
eavesdropper, Alice sends the A sequence to Charlie. Af-
ter hearing from Charlie, Alice publishes the positions of
the sampling photons of the other subset and lets Charlie
make GHZ basis measurements on the sampling photons
of A, B, C sequence. After Charlie announces his mea-
surements results, Alice lets Bob publish his operations
on the sampling photons in the B, C sequence. They
then estimate the error rate of the transmission of A se-
quence. If there is no eavesdropping, they continue to the
next step, otherwise they abandon the communication.
(S6) Thus Charlie owns the A, B, C sequence. With-
out Bob’s permission, Charlie can not obtain Alice’s se-
cret messages. Only after Bob published his operations
on the photons of B, C sequence, could Charlie acquire
Alice’s secret messages by performing a GHZ basis mea-
surement on each of the GHZ states.
So far we have presented the CQSDC scheme. The se-
curity of the present scheme is similar to those in Refs.
[10, 22]. The participators check the existence of eaves-
dropper during each transmission of photon sequence.
The security for the transmission of photons can be re-
duced to the security of the BBM92 protocol [23]. The
process for the transmission of A, B sequence from Bob
to Alice is similar to that in Ref. [2]. Alice and Bob
measure the sampling photons in a randomly selected
measuring basis, which ensures the security of the trans-
mission of photon sequence. Bob first performs a random
unitary operation on the B sequence and then sends it
to Alice, which prevent Charlie from acquiring partial
secret message without the permission of Bob. Without
Bob’s operations, Charlie performs GHZ basis measure-
ment on photons in the A, B, C sequence and she can
obtain partial information of Alice at the step 6 of the
scheme. The security for the transmission of C sequence
in our scheme is similar to that of the C sequence in Deng
et al.’s two-step QSDC protocol [10]. The transmission
of A, B sequence from Alice to Charlie is the same as
the transmission of M sequence in the two step proto-
col. Because of the qubit correlation of each GHZ state,
eavesdropper’s eavesdropping will be detected during the
eavesdropping check. Charlie cannot obtain Alice’s secret
without Bob’s permission because Bob performs random
unitary operations on the photons in the B, C sequence.
Thus the present scheme is unconditional security.
We then generalize the CQSDC scheme to a MCQSDC
one. Suppose Alice is the sender; Bob, Charlie, Dick,· · · ,
York are the controllers; Zach is the receiver. The first
two step of the MCQSDC scheme is the same as those
of CQSDC scheme. We describe the MCQSDC scheme
from the step 3.
(S3′) Bob chooses randomly the Hadamard operation,
H =
1√
2
(|0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|+ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|) (6)
or the identity operation. He also chooses randomly one
of four unitary operations, I, σz, σx, iσy. Bob then per-
forms these two operations on each of the photons in the
C sequence. He then sends the C sequence photons to
Charlie.
(S4′) After receiving the C sequence, Charlie performs
the similar operations as Bob and sends it to the next
controller, Dick. Dick and the remaining controllers re-
peat the similar operations as Charlie until the receiver,
Zach receives the C sequence. The H operation is very
important for the security of the scheme. Suppose the
participators only performs I, σz, σx or iσy operations
on the C sequence randomly and an eavesdropper, Eve
intercepts the C sequence. She then prepares a fake C
sequence which belongs to one part of EPR pairs and
sends it to the next participator, say Charlie. Eve can
also intercepts the sequence on which Charlie performed
his operations. She then performs Bell basis measure-
ment on the intercepted sequence and her other part of
EPR pairs. Thus Eve can acquire the operation informa-
tion of the controller Charlie.
(S5′) After hearing from Zach, Alice selects randomly
a sufficiently large subset from A, B sequence to check
eavesdropping. She then publishes the position of sam-
pling photons. She lets Zach measure the sampling pho-
tons in the C sequence by using either Z-basis or X-
basis and publishes his measurement results. For each
of the sampling photon, Alice randomly selects a con-
troller to announce his operation information firstly and
then the others publish their operation information on
the sampling photons in turn. Suppose the number of
H operations performed on each sampling photon in the
C sequence by the controllers is odd. If Alice lets Zach
measure the sampling photon in the Z-basis (X-basis),
she performs Bell basis (Z-basis) measurement on her
corresponding two photons. Suppose the number of H
operations is even. If Zach performs Z-basis (X-basis)
measurement, Alice measures the corresponding photons
4in Z-basis (Bell basis). After doing these, Alice can de-
termine the error rate of the transmission of C sequence.
If she confirms there is no eavesdropping, the process is
continued. Otherwise, the process is stopped.
(S6′) Alice chooses the subsets of the sampling pho-
tons, encodes her secret messages on the AB sequence
and transmits the A, B sequence to Zach step by step
in the same way as the step 5 of the CQSDC scheme.
During the eavesdropping checks for the transmission of
A sequence, Alice lets the controllers Bob, Charlie, · · · ,
York announce their operations on the sampling photons.
If the number of H operations is odd, Zach first per-
forms H operation on each of the selected photon in the
C sequence and then measures each of the corresponding
three-photon in GHZ basis. If the number of H oper-
ations is even, Zach performs GHZ basis measurement
directly. Alice then lets Zach publish his measurement
results. Thus Alice and Charlie can estimate the error
rate of the transmission of A sequence. Actually, Eve
can only interrupt the transmission of A, B sequence
and cannot steal any information even if she attacks the
photons.
(S7′) If the controllers permit Zach to reconstruct Al-
ice’s secret messages, they tell Zach their operation in-
formation. If the number of H operations is odd, Zach
first performs H operation on the corresponding photon
and then measure the three-photon in GHZ basis. If the
number of H operations is even, Zach performs GHZ ba-
sis measurement directly. Thus Zach can obtain Alice’s
secret messages under the permission of the controller
Bob, Charlie, · · · , York.
TheH operations performed by controllers can prevent
Eve or a dishonest controller from obtaining the control
information, which we have described it in the step 4′.
During the eavesdropping check for the transmission of
C sequence, Alice fist lets Zach publish his measurement
results and then the controllers announce their operation
information, which ensure each controller can really act
as a controller. If the controllers first publish their oper-
ation information, Zach can obtain Alice’s secret as long
as he acquires Bob’s permission. In the present scheme,
only with the permissions of all the controllers could Zach
acquire the secret messages. The security of MCQSDC
scheme is the same as that of CQSDC.
So far we have presented a MCQSDC scheme based
on dense coding of three-photon entangled state and
qubit transmission in blocks. We first present a CQSDC
scheme controlled by a single controller, and then gener-
alize it to a MCQSDC scheme. The sender encodes three
bits of secret message on two photons of GHZ state and
the receiver can reconstruct the sender’s secret with the
permissions of all the controllers. It seems like a QSS
scheme, but the sender’s secret can send to the receiver
directly and the information of the receiver is asymmetric
to the controllers. We also analyzed that the security of
this scheme is the same as that of the BBM92 protocol,
which is unconditionally secure. In the present scheme,
all of the GHZ states are used to transmit the secret ex-
cept those used to check eavesdropping. The scheme has
a high source capacity in that GHZ state forms a large
Hilbert space.
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